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The Eurasian Economic Union: A case of reproductive integration? 
 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appeared in January 2015 as the latest 
and most ambitious attempt at reconnecting the post-Soviet space. Building on 
the Customs Union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (2010), and 
successfully extending membership to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (2015), the 
EAEU not only connects a market of over 182 million people, but has the stated 
aim of utilising European Union (EU) experience to achieve deep integration in a 
fraction of the time. Based on original fieldwork conducted in Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia, this article examines the kind of integration project 
currently under construction, as well as the EAEU’s ability to make a significant 
impact in the region. As argued, despite early achievements, the EAEU is very 
much limited to reproducing sovereignty rather than transforming it, marking a 
clear disconnect between rhetoric and reality. Moreover, when viewed from the 
perspective of the three ‘I’s – institutions, identity and international context – 
even this modest reality faces significant barriers. 
Keywords: Eurasian; economic; Russia; integration; sovereignty  
INTRODUCTION 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) officially appeared as a regional organisation 
on 1 January 2015, following the signing of a landmark treaty by the Presidents of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in Astana, Kazakhstan, on 29 May 2014. As a territory 
encompassing over 20 million square kilometres and with a market size of just over 182 
million people, the EAEU represents the most significant development in the region’s 
economic and political landscape since the European Union’s (EU) eastern expansion in 
the early 2000s. The addition of Armenia in January 2015, following its earlier rejection 
of an EU association agreement, and Kyrgyzstan in May 2015, has given Eurasian 
integration impetus and a feeling of genuine optimism in a part of the world that has 
been slow to realise the economic integration imperative. 
But, despite the importance of EAEU, the kind of integration member states are 
attempting and, by extension, the implications of this integration, are less than clear. 
Distracted by the Ukraine crisis, western media have largely ignored the EAEU, while 
the academic community remains divided on the prospects of the project. Recent studies 
do little to clarify the picture, either dismissing the EAEU out of hand as a thinly veiled 
manifestation of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions (Adomeit 2012; Krickovic 2014) or 
taking a cautiously optimistic approach, but none the less viewing further integration as 
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largely inevitable (Dutkiewicz 2015; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012a; Libman and 
Vonkurov 2012; Sakwa 2015). This latter literature echoes high-level statements 
coming from EAEU leaders, which emphasise the serious, long-term nature of the 
project but also its ambitious goals of transforming the region’s economic and political 
relations. Indeed, the theme of ‘transformation’ is one that subtly runs through official 
discourse, where references to the supranational component of the EAEU and analogies 
to the EU are common. Some scholars have already noted how Eurasian integration 
appears to buck the trend of second wave regionalism in its efforts to imitate the EU and 
pursue ‘deep integration’ (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012a, p. 220). 
It is against this backdrop that this article seeks to make sense of Eurasian economic 
integration. What kind of integration are member states attempting? Can the EAEU 
serve to transform the region’s economic and political relations? And what are the 
prospects of this actually happening in the medium to long-term? This article attempts 
to answer these questions utilising original research conducted just before and after the 
official unveiling of the EAEU in January 2015. This research includes over 30 face-to-
face, in-depth interviews conducted in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia with 
country experts and EAEU stakeholders, including representatives from the newly 




The organisation of this article is as follows. The first part briefly outlines the 
development of the EAEU and the debates on the kind of integration currently 
underway. The second section outlines the analytical framework used in this article to 
gauge the transformative potential of the EAEU, with the final three sections exploring 
the three I’s of Eurasian integration – institutions, identity and the international context. 
This article contributes to existing literature in the following ways. First, unlike most 
research on the subject of Eurasian integration, this article is based on the first hand 
views of those individuals actually involved in the integration process in four of the five 
EAEU member states, helping to ground the academic debate in a much-needed 
empirical reality. Second, this article revives and older but important analytical 
distinction between ‘transformative’ and ‘reproductive’ regionalism (Schmitter 2004) 
allowing for a better understanding of the EAEU and providing a suitable framework 
for future comparative analysis on Eurasian integration.  
As argued in the material that follows, the EAEU has the potential to expand its remit 
and bring welfare benefits to member states, as to some extent it already has. But, 
beneath the rhetoric, Eurasian economic integration has more modest sovereignty-
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enhancing goals, placing the EAEU well in line with new regionalism projects seen in 
other parts of the world. Moreover, the possibility of the EAEU moving beyond the 
narrow interests of its member states is severely constrained by the interconnection of 
weak institutions, identity politics and the prevailing international context – factors long 
known to affect the prospects of regional integration (Nye 1968; Schmitter 1969). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EURASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appeared on 1 January 2015 as the final part of 
a three-stage process that saw the creation of a Customs Union in 2010 and a Single 
Economic Space in 2012. The EAEU founding members – Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia – quickly added Armenia to their ranks in January 2015 and by May 2015 
Kyrgyzstan was all but included in the Union after its national parliament (the Jogorku 
Kenesh) ratified the EAEU treaty. The whole process of creating the EAEU, from the 
formation of the Customs Union in 2010 and up to the extension of membership to 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in 2015 has been aptly described as a ‘headlong rush’ 
(Interview, Belarus, 2014) – a rapid and intensive phase of integration that has so far 
covered a great deal of ground in a short period of time. 
Indeed, the appearance of a functioning economic union stands in stark contrast to the 
stalled Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) initiatives from the early 1990s. As 
early as 1993, CIS heads of state were talking of the need to reconnect former Soviet 
economies in order to off-set the dire economic conditions that followed the collapse of 
the USSR and as early as 1994, the president of Kazakhstan, Nursulan Nazarbaev, 
voiced the idea of a ‘Eurasian Union’ (Nazarbaev 1997). But, with state-building and 
sovereignty high on the agenda of most regional leaders at this time, these ideas were 
considered premature.  
Eventually, three post-Soviet states – Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia – did push the 
integration agenda and by 1995 an agreement on tariff-free trade was in place, with 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan subsequently joining the trio in 1998. In 2000, these same 
five member states formed the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) which 
became the immediate predecessor to the EAEU. Although lacking a supranational 
element to direct the integration process, EurAsEC did provide a useful forum to 
eventually push for the next stage of integration. At a meeting of the EurAsEC interstate 
council in Minsk, Belarus, in October 2014 a decision was taken to dissolve EurAsEC 
into the EAEU from 1 January 2015.  
The background drivers for the latest intensive phase of integration, 2010-2015, include 
the on-going effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, but also the broad desire shared 
by each member state to boost trade and investment and to increase competitiveness, in 
a part of the world slow to adapt to the demands of the globalized economy. Another 
important factor noted by some scholars is the newfound willingness of member states 
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to delegate recently acquired sovereignty that was so fiercely guarded in the early post-
Soviet years (Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015, p. 61).  
However, a more controversial aspect of the EAEU is the geopolitical component and in 
particular the perception that Eurasian integration is a manifestation of Russia’s 
hegemonic ambitions in the region. A number of studies have focused on this 
geopolitical component in an attempt to explain the appearance of the EAEU, in 
particular its timing (Adomeit 2012; Krickovic 2014). From this perspective, the EAEU 
represents little more than an attempt to directly counter the EU’s new generation of 
Association Agreements (Adomeit 2012) or a Russian reaction to perceived changes in 
the international system, at a time when western power is being called into question 
(Krickovic 2014, p. 523). 
Despite these reservations, the creation of a more robust institutional framework has 
lent credibility to the idea that the EAEU is in fact a more serious project than narrowly 
focused realist accounts acknowledge. Excluding the Eurasian Court established in 2001 
under the aegis of EurAsEC, the Eurasian Economic Commission became the first 
‘supranational’ body designed to facilitate post-Soviet integration when it appeared in 
February 2012. Aside from these institutional developments, a second, visible 
achievement of the EAEU is its successful expansion. As mentioned, Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in 2015, but there are also indications that Eurasian 
economic integration intends to go beyond the post-Soviet space.  
On 23 December 2014, the three founding member of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
signed an agreement on establishing international partnerships between the EAEU and 
third countries (EAEU 2014) and on 29 May 2015 a free trade agreement between the 
EAEU and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam came into effect (EAEU 2015a). The 
Eurasian Commission has also set up a working group on the feasibility of a free trade 
zone with Egypt (Eurasian Commission 2014a), while states as far afield as Israel and 
India have received high level mention as prospective partners beyond the immediate 
region (Kremlin 2015). 
There is no question that high-level statements coming from EAEU leaders have also 
raised expectations that this integration project is one capable of transforming the 
immediate region and beyond. Kazakhstan’s president, Nursulan Nazarbaev has 
identified the EAEU with the ambitious goal of increasing economic competitiveness 
(Nazarbaev 2014a) in a region that lags on most economic indicators. Russia’s 
president, Vladimir Putin, has tied integration to Russia’s equally ambitious 
modernisation plans, in recognition that the previous economic model has ‘come to an 
end’ (Putin 2014a). In terms of regional relations, Belarus President, Aleksandr 
Lukashenko has identified the EAEU as the foundation for future political unity, as well 
as military and humanitarian cooperation (Lukashenko 2014). 
In terms of the wider region, both Putin and Lukashenko have at various times framed 
Eurasian integration in terms of building a ‘greater Europe’. This mega entity stretching 
from Lisbon to Vladivostok, will include both the EU and EAEU (Lukashenko 2011) 
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what Lukashenko has termed ‘integration of (the two) integrations’ – a goal still 
achievable, according to Lukashenko, despite the Russia-EU stand-off over Ukraine 
(Gurina 2015). For his part, Vladimir Putin has spoken of the way Eurasian economic 
integration can create the conditions to ‘change the geopolitical and geo-economic 
configuration of the entire continent’, creating an ‘undoubted positive global effect’ 
(Putin 2011a). 
But perhaps the most ambitious aspect of the EAEU is the attempt to embark on an EU-
style integration project. Sergei Glazyev, an advisor to Putin on matters pertaining to 
Eurasian integration has confirmed that the EAEU is ‘following the general contours of 
European integration’ and guided by the pragmatic objective of increasing economic 
competitiveness by ‘ceding sovereign rights’ and steadily deepening integration and 
harmonizing national laws (Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015, p. 61, 79). Both the 
Kazakhstani and Russian presidents have used key-note speeches on Eurasian 
integration to draw parallels with the EU and hint that this is indeed the model the 
EAEU is attempting to follow (Nazarbaev 2014b; Putin 2011). 
It is against this background that a number of scholars have begun to paint a more 
optimistic picture of Eurasian economic integration (Dutkiewicz 2015; Dragneva and 
Wolczuk 2012a; Libman and Vonkurov 2012; Sakwa 2015). The EAEU has been 
described as bucking the trend of second wave regionalism in its efforts to imitate the 
EU and pursue ‘deep integration’ and ‘institutionalisation’ (Dragneva and Wolczuk 
2012a: 220) and as an ‘EU-like institution’, working to lower trade barriers and 
harmonise legislation and then, at its later stages, attempt political integration (Gvosdev 
and Marsh 2014, p. 188). Other studies have pointed to the inevitability of economic 
integration in a region where economic life was once highly interdependent. Libman 
and Vonkurov use a ‘U shape’ analogy to describe the particular holding-together 
pattern of post-Soviet integration, where high levels of interdependence in the Soviet 
system made way for disintegration and subsequent reintegration (Libman and 
Vonkurov 2012). The implication is that the costs of disintegration outweigh the costs 
of integration, leaving regional leaders with little choice but cooperate with their 
regional partners. 
Taken together, the progress of the EAEU and the rhetoric surrounding it lend credence 
to the idea that what is being attempted is nothing short of transformative integration – 
not only economic transformation but potentially political transformation too, as 
competition between member states, the effect of supranational institutions and even 
unintended consequences lead to ever greater integration and sovereignty pooling. 
 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Assessing the potential of an integration project in its early stages of development is no 
easy task, and this is particularly true for the EAEU with its relatively short track record 
(Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012a, p. 211). Economic indicators for the Customs Union in 
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the period 2010-2015, for example, need to be understood in the context of volatile 
international circumstances and offer little insight into the potential of Eurasian 
economic integration. Any analysis of production levels and trade volumes between 
member states, 2010-2015, must take into account the fall in international commodity 
prices (in particular for oil and gas), the effects of the global financial crisis (in 
particular the economic contraction and then expansion, 2010-2012) and the on-going 
effects of economic sanctions imposed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea as 
well as Russia’s own counter-sanctions. In short, and despite studies on the EAEU’s 
viability in terms of economic transactions (Blockmans et al. 2012), the economic 
outcomes of integration to date remain, at best, unreliable.  
In addition, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the EAEU in terms of 
functionality, reflecting the success of member states in moving from Customs Union to 
full economic union in only five years: 
‘At the moment what we have is a very embryonic institutional design. We do not 
know exactly how it will work’ (Interview, Russia, 2014). 
The recent additions of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan will undoubtedly complicate the 
picture in the short-term, as both states harmonize tariffs and legislation and as EAEU 
operating procedures are refined and developed. 
These points relate to the bigger problem of selecting an appropriate theoretical 
framework for analysing the EAEU. In short, there is no single approach to 
understanding regional integration. It is a pluralistic field driven by competing theories 
that work on different epistemological and ontological premises. Regional integration is 
typically described in very different ways by different researchers, depending on the 
particular approach they take.  
However, for the purposes of this article, where the main research question relates to the 
dependent variable – what kind of integration? – the analytical framework becomes 
clearer. This is even more the case when we consider those high-level statements on the 
EAEU that stress its ‘transformative’ goals. By any objective measure, Eurasian 
economic integration is an ambitious project, seen in terms of the official rhetoric but 
also the EAEU’s official statutory aims of achieving the four economic freedoms (free 
movement of goods, services, labour and capital) and harmonizing economic and 
foreign policy. As noted, scholars have highlighted the unusual way Eurasian 
integration appears to be following the path of first wave integration – a path largely 
shunned by regional integration organisations since the formation of the EU.  
In many ways, ‘transformation’ is the key concept that divides the European experience 
of integration from all others. It is also the key distinction between theoretical 
approaches. According to Schmitter (2004), himself a first wave integration scholar, all 
theories of regional integration can be separated along ontological lines according to the 
degree to which they emphasise a transformative or reproductive process. 
Transformative integration, as seen in the case of the EU, ‘transforms’ the nature of 
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member state sovereignty as well as the relations between member states. Reproductive 
integration, in contrast, simply ‘reproduces the characteristics of its participants as well 
as the interstate system of which they are a part’ (Schmitter 2004, p. 47). 
As such, neo-functionalism is an obvious choice of analytical framework to guide the 
empirical analysis in what follows, albeit with the need to consider one or two 
additional intervening variables important in the context of Eurasian integration (see 
below). Essentially, neo-functionalism, as a theory, describes the process of 
transformative integration where, after initial union, successive conflicts present 
member states with critical junctures and the choice to either increase or decrease their 
integrative efforts. According to neo-functional theory, the costs of disintegration and 
‘spill-back’ are too prohibitive, leaving the option of ‘spill-over’ and the expansion of 
tasks the only viable option for member states. 
Spill-over is the mechanism for deepening integration and includes the expansion of 
integration to new sectors as well as the rejuvenation of existing sectors (Schmitter 
1969). In short, it refers to a process whereby member states, having agreed on 
collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment, 
attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by collaboration in another, related sector 
(expanding the scope of commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the 
original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or both (Schmitter 1969, p. 
162). 
Nye (1968), another first wave integration scholar, talks of the measurable indicators of 
spill-over, such as the growth of key institutions, the stimulation of private sector 
organisations, attitudes and public opinion; the influence on government behaviour, 
including decreasing levels of corruption; and geographical extension. Nye also notes 
that growing ‘politicisation’ is a sign of progress on the path to union (Nye 1968, p. 
410-422). Politicisation happens when the controversial nature of decision making 
increases, leading to a widening of the audience or clientele interested in integration 
(Schmitter 1969, p. 165-66). When politicisation reaches a level where it jeopardizes 
their tenure in office, national governments prefer greater task expansion to contraction 
(Schmitter 2004, p. 50-51).  
According to neo-functional theory, the key enablers of spill-over are supranational 
institutions and their interaction with other actors. Supranational institutions are not 
background factors in the integration process, but are interested agents, with their own 
resources and power able to push the integration processes (Lindberg 1963). They are 
important independent, authoritative agents, necessary for overcoming the high-levels 
of mistrust that naturally exist between member states (Schmitter 2004, p. 50).  
Ernst Haas, probably the most important first wave integration scholar identified 
supranational institutions as a necessary condition for transformative integration (Haas 
1964), able to unite with vested economic interests, such as non-state actors and the 
business community to create their own integration agenda (Haas 2001, p. 23). Even the 
rival inter-governmental approach to EU integration ascribes an important place to 
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economic interest groups, using supranational institutions and their own governments to 
push for integration (Moravcsik 1998, p. 6-7). In short, this kind of transformative 
integration has been described as ‘attacking the castle of national sovereignty by 
stealth’, where interest groups act as mercenaries and technocrats as agents within the 
castle walls to ‘quietly open the gates’ (Nye 1968, p. 381). 
However, the neo-functional framework is not without problems. Neo-functional 
theory, as an explanation of EU transformative integration has a chequered history. Not 
only has been declared obsolete on several occasions, but first wave integration theorists 
were already noting a serious mismatch between rhetoric and reality in non-European 
integration projects as early as the 1960s. Nye, for example, observed that the most 
prevalent form of regionalism in less developed areas is an ephemeral expression of the 
superstate sense of community without any significant restructuring of interests. In 
other words, ‘token integration’. (Nye 1968, p. 377). For his part, Haas found it unlikely 
that the dependent variable of system transformation could happen beyond the European 
site (Haas 1964).  
Part of the problem with the neo-functional framework is that the narrow focus on 
institutions and non-state actors does not credit the importance of other background 
factors. Certain intervening variables, which act as facilitators and inhibitors and which 
combine to affect the prospects of deep, transformative integration, need to be taken 
into account. This was a point that became clear to first wave integration scholars by the 
1970s, coinciding with the slow-down in the EU’s own integration efforts.  
The importance of identity, for example, came to the fore during the ‘empty chair 
crisis’, 1965-1966, when the French nationalism of Charles de Gaulle temporarily 
halted European integration. The existence of a regional ideology or identity as well as 
shared values and beliefs among member states may be insufficient to bring about 
transformative integration, but ‘insufficient does not mean unimportant’ (Nye 1968, p. 
423). In retrospect, it has been noted that neo-functionalism may have underestimated 
the role of resistance from national authorities (Schmitter 2004, p. 56). 
The same can be said of the importance of the international context or exogenous 
factors, that include regional economic dynamics but also the extent to which other 
actors outside the region will ‘help or hinder’ integration (Nye 1968, p. 415). In some 
cases, the international context facilitates integration, forcing member states – 
regardless of their original intentions – to adopt common policies vis-à-vis non-
participant third parties (Schmitter 1969, p. 165). In either case, the role of ‘external 
shocks’ as either inhibitors or facilitators was also an area that neo-functionalism failed 
to adequately consider (Schmitter 2004, p. 56). 
It is in view of these points that the broad framework of neo-functionalism can be useful 
for understanding Eurasian economic integration. As detailed in the material that 
follows, to understand the kind of integration the EAEU is currently attempting, and by 
extension the factors that may enable or impede the EAEU’s transformative goals, 
attention must be given to the role of identity and international factors as important 
10 
 
intervening variables, along with the important the role of institutions and non-state 
actors. This focus on institutions, identity and the international context or exogenous 
factors provides a clear framework to approach the EAEU.  
This framework also fits the implicit logic found in recent literature on the EAEU, 
where there is a palpable element of teleology, in particular those attempts to go beyond 
simplistic realist explanations based on geo-politics and power in the international 
system. As outlined in the previous section, this teleology is based on an assumption 
that the costs of disintegration far outweigh the costs of further integration, and that 
more integration will almost certainly follow (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2012, p. 221; 
Dutkiewicz 2015, p. 2). This assumption – that integration is largely unavoidable in 
Eurasia – is also reminiscent of assumptions found in neo-functionalism, where the 
choice for more integration is viewed as the most rational. 
 
THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: INSTITUTIONS 
One of the most significant moments in the development of the EAEU has been the 
creation of an institutional framework able to push the integration agenda. This not only 
includes the Customs Union (2010) but also the Eurasian Economic Commission that 
began working in 2012 with the express aim of ensuring the functioning and 
development of the EAEU. In fact, the Eurasian Commission is the first supranational 
institution to appear in almost 25 years of post-Soviet integration, representing a notable 
achievement in its own right and a strong signal of intent from EAEU founding states. 
As previously outlined, the prospects of deeper integration, according to the neo-
functional approach depends to a large extent on the willingness of national 
governments to delegate sovereignty to ‘supranational’ institutions and, in turn, the 
ability of these institutions to work with vested interests, notably economic actors, to 
push the integration process forward. As elaborated in this section, despite successes, 
the EAEU faces significant barriers on both counts.  
 
The Eurasian Economic Commission  
The Eurasian Commission consists of two main bodies – the Commission Council and 
the Commission Board. The Commission Board comprises three minsters from each 
member state – 14 at the time of writing, but 15 when Kyrgyzstan finally joins and their 
representation increases from two to three minsters. The Head of the Commission, 
presently Viktor Khristenko (Russia), is also a member of the Board but without a 
cabinet post (the only minister without a portfolio). The Commission Council is the 
higher body of the two and is represented by one deputy prime-minister from each 
member state. The Council convenes to negotiate and consult when necessary, while the 
Board works on a permanent basis.  
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In terms of functioning, there are 23 departments under ministerial control in the 
Commission each divided among the members of the Board, with the emphasis on 
‘equality’ and an even division of labour between national representatives. Each 
department covers an area of integration and economic activity, coordinating with 
corresponding government bodies in member states. The Eurasian Commission is also 
involved in international cooperation and, as already mentioned, there is a general 
acknowledgement that the EAEU will continue to look for new members and expand. 
Despite some criticism that the Commission is a Russia-dominated institution, in 
particular since it is based in Moscow with Russian as the working language and with a 
predominance of Russian support staff (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012b, p 7), the 
Commission is balanced by the absence of any weighted voting that would favour 
Russia (a problem with EurAsEC) meaning that consensus decision making is the norm, 
although there is limited use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for low-level 
decisions. In addition, the first ever meeting of the Commission Council in January 
2013 resolved to establish representative offices in Belarus and Kazakhstan and, overall, 
the Commission is characterised by highly professional staff, committed to the task of 
integration:   
‘Although we all are representatives of our own countries within the Commission, 
we do not represent the interests of our countries… we all stand for the common 
interests of integration’ (Interview, Eurasian Commission, 2014). 
However, the Eurasian Commission from the outset was designed to be a much less 
ambitious supra-national body than the official discourse surrounding the EAEU 
suggests, reflecting the fact that member states were not prepared to give it anything 
more than limited competencies (see next section). Although the Eurasian Commission 
itself states that Commission decisions are ‘binding on the territory of the EAEU 
member states’ (EAEU 2015b) this is more than a little deceptive. 
The first point to note about the Eurasian Commission is that it is more inter-
governmental than supranational. All Commission members are delegates nominated by 
national governments and whatever decision the Commission makes, at this stage, is 
only the result of consensus between member states. The highest body of the EAEU is 
the Supreme Council which comprises member state presidents, not the Commission, 
and as such all decisions taken by this ‘supranational’ institution are open to veto. Even 
if the professional Commission ministers put their national allegiances to one side and 
try to push the path of integration for the ‘greater good’, the reality is that all important 
decisions are passed up the chain of command, first to the Commission Council in the 
form of national government deputy prime ministers, and then, if no agreement is 
found, to the Supreme Council. As one interviewee noted: 
‘Although the supranational element of the EAEU could be extended in the future, 
the current reality is one of hierarchy’ (Armenia 2014). 
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The second and no less important point with the Commission is that there are few, if 
any, mechanisms of enforcement. Unlike the EU, where the European Commission’s 
directives are mandatory for all member states, the Eurasian Commission has the power 
to monitor, make suggestions and issue orders, but the only further option is to refer the 
case to the Eurasian Court – created in 2000 and itself a remnant of EurAsEC – which 
has no enforcement powers. In any case, the Commission must notify the EAEU 
Supreme Council once a case is referred to the Eurasian Court, and this opens up 
opportunities for behind the scenes negotiations among EAEU heads of state. 
A good example of the weakness of the Commission can be seen in its inability to 
tackle monopolies. The Commission has repeatedly flagged examples of unfair 
competition, such as the price of cross-border air and train tickets, as a barrier to the 
principles of free-trade, but has been unable do any more than suggest the creation of 
working groups to further study the problem (Eurasian Commission 2014b, 2014c). As 
noted by the former Eurasian Commission deputy Director of the Department for 
Competition and State Procurement Policy, Boris Parsegov, the Commission, having 
identified unfair competition, can write a request and issue orders to national anti-
monopoly agencies, but what happens after this point is already beyond the remit of the 
Commission (Bekmatambetova 2014).  
With the extent of cartels and monopolies in member states, in particular in Armenia 
and Belarus, it is difficult to envisage how the EAEU’s watered down supranational 
institutions can make an impact. Armenia, for example, has a long-term problem with 
commodity based cartels (BTI 2014, p. 15) which emerged as a result of the country’s 
conflict economy and closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. In this case, it is 
doubtful that the Moscow-based Commission with its limited powers can succeed where 
successive national governments have failed. The Commission’s Conference on anti-
trust regulation and competitiveness in Minsk in 2014, for example, noted how 
sustainable growth is ‘inextricably linked’ to competition and proposed that Belarus 
introduce legislation to ‘control state involvement in entrepreneurial activities’ 
(Eurasian Commission 2014d). However, as the Belarus economic model is heavily 
oriented to state involvement and state subsidies, a large part of the economy is in 
essence a state-run monopoly. 
In the absence of genuine powers to enforce decisions, the main challenge for the 
Commission is to try to harmonise diverging national interests and achieve consensus 
on issues pertaining to the common market, as without full agreement at the national 
level, the Commission cannot function as a supranational organ. But with stark 
differences in economic models, priorities and sheer size between member states (see 
next section) achieving consensus is no easy task, confirmed by the fact that the EAEU 
is already following the path of multi-speed integration. 
Aside from a general acknowledgment that Belarus lags behind other member states and 
will require more time to liberalise its economy, each of the four economic freedoms are 
developing (or not) at different speeds. The free movement of services and capital are 
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unlikely to be realised in the short-term. Kazakhstan, for example, negotiated 
exemptions from liberalising transport services to protect domestic carriers, meaning 
there is no common transport market at present. There is still no common energy 
market, meaning no non-discriminatory access to the Russian gas transit system for 
Belarusian and Kazakhstani suppliers. The free movement of labour is a problem under 
discussion, in particular residency rules that limit the ability of entrepreneurs to open or 
relocate businesses and bring in personnel from other member states and even the free 
movement of goods has restrictions. Sensitive goods, such as alcohol and 
pharmaceuticals are still subject to restrictions as member states are unwilling to fully 
open their markets to competition with these goods. Monetary policy is another area 
under discussion, although a recent meeting of the EAEU Supreme Council in May 
2015, Putin sounded a note of caution: ‘we are fully aware that this is a matter for the 
future. Nobody here is going to get ahead of themselves’ (Putin 2015).  
 
Actors and integration 
The existence of multi-speed integration so early on in the EAEU’s development has 
been noted as a strength, as too the ‘hierarchic’ command structure with its relatively 
under-powered Commission. At present, member states are able to commit to as much 
integration as they are ready for, while the combination of weak institutions at the 
national level and the absence of effective democratic checks and balances mean that 
EAEU leaders can make quick decisions without the need for lengthy public or 
parliamentary consultation. The overall institutional design of the EAEU, with real 
decision-making located in the Supreme Council means that the heads of state can 
decide to take integration in different directions, to develop stronger supranational 
bodies in the future, should that avenue become expedient: 
‘In my opinion, the established institutional form of the Customs Union is actually 
quite flexible – all the countries move towards each other by small steps’ 
(Interview, Russia, 2014).   
However, the EAEU model, based on presidential ‘manual control’ has obvious 
drawbacks. Not only is the fate of the entire integration process dependent on the 
chemistry that exists between national leaders (and their ability to retain presidential 
power) but there is significantly less room for other actors in the integration process to 
play their role. In essence, the EAEU has a two-way interaction problem, where the 
Commission is too weak to effectively push the integration process forward and non-
state actors too weak or too cautious to use supranational institutions to lobby their 
interests – a crucial limit on the ability of the EAEU to achieve ‘transformative’ 
integration. 
A generalised indication of the extent of this two-way interaction problem can be seen 
in comparative measures of political and economic pluralism in EAEU member states. 
For example, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are each rated ‘not free’ by the US based 
14 
 
democracy advocacy organisation Freedom House in their 2015 survey, scoring close to 
bottom on measures of civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House 2015). 
Moreover, the direction of development suggests a downward trend, with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia tightening legislation governing civil society in recent years, in 
particular NGO funding, with pressure on Armenia and Kyrgyzstan to follow suit 
(IPHR 2013). 
In terms of economic indicators, EAEU member states fare no better. Kazakhstan’s 
economy was rated as ‘moderately free’ on the Heritage ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ 
(IEF, published by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation) and the 69
th
 
freest economy out of 178 countries, mainly due to relatively low taxes and investment 
freedom. Russia’s economy (ranked 143) was rated ‘unfree’ and Belarus (153) as 
‘repressed’, giving an indication of the problems faced by the business community, 
where state intervention, corruption and weak rule of law are the norm rather than the 
exception (IEF 2015). 
The ability of businesses to lobby, in particular at the regional level and in particular in 
Russia and Kazakhstan, should not be underestimated. In the 1990s, most businesses 
developed close ties with regional administrations (Libman and Vinokurov 2012, p. 
102) and in many ways the development of the EAEU is one outcome. However, the 
notion that the business community or any societal actor can join forces with the 
Eurasian Commission and push their shared integration interests, or in the words of 
Haas ‘rely on supranational institutions rather than their own governments to realise 
their demands’ (Haas 2001, p. 23) is erroneous. Leaders in EAEU member states, it 
should be noted, continue to be wary of pluralism and sources of independent economic 
power.  
For its part, the Eurasian Commission is acutely aware of the problem: 
‘We believe that the level of the involvement of all the subjects who have their 
interests is not sufficiently high. In comparison with the EU, here, business has 
fewer chances to be heard.’ (Interview, Eurasian Commission, 2014) 
Since its creation in 2012, the Commission has tried to involve the business community 
through various Consulting Committees under the aegis of the Commission Board. The 
Department on Financial Politics, for example, has two Committees, one on Taxation 
Politics on Financial Markets and these Committees invite representatives of the 
business community to participate in discussions and give their recommendations. 
Forums are also increasingly used by the Commission to involve both the business 
community and state structures in the discussion of important economic issues, where 
all sides have a chance to express their concerns and make proposals, summarized in the 
form of a Forum Resolution at the end. In addition, the Advisory Council on the 
Eurasian Commission – the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Business Dialogue – held its 
first session in Moscow on 20 March 2013 (Eurasian Commission 2013). The 
Commission has also made important advances in developing Regulatory Impact 
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Analysis (RIA) procedures, meaning supranational laws are considered in terms of their 
effect on the business community (Eurasian Commission 2014e).  
However, there is an opinion that the Commission has yet to reach out and to effectively 
promote and explain its activities. The RIA procedures, for example, only envisage the 
creation of working groups to consider the impact of legislation on the business 
environment, not their social impact (Eurasian Commission 2014e), and with the 
absence of a legislative dimension and significant public involvement, the EAEU is 
very much a top down process lacking a solid societal base.  
In fact, the discussion on creating a Eurasian Parliament has so far created a strong, 
negative reaction. On 4 October 2012, exactly 12 months to the day after Vladimir Putin 
published his landmark Eurasian integration article in the Russian-language daily 
Izvestia, Russian State Duma speaker Sergei Narishkin, published his own article in the 
same newspaper speaking of the desirability of a Eurasian parliament to coordinate 
Commission decisions with national legislatures and to expand public involvement with 
the project (Narishkin 2012).  
But, to date, there is no agreement on either its desirability or format. There are fears 
that a directly elected parliament will see the asymmetry of the Union reflected, 
meaning a majority of seats for Russia, while nationalists in Kazakhstan reacted angrily 
to the idea of a Eurasian Parliament as a threat to sovereignty, prompting Nazarbaev to 
issue the first of a number of public statements underlining his intention to leave the 
EAEU, should a threat to sovereignty arise (Guzenkova 2013, p. 25). As such, the 
project of a Eurasian Parliament remains on the backburner:  
‘It is unlikely that there will ever be a Eurasian Parliament or any kind of 
democratic participation of the population to decision-making’ (Interview, Belarus, 
2014). 
The sensitivity to overtly political institutions reflects the deep discomfort, in particular 
in Kazakhstan, at any attempt to politicise the integration process. It is no accident that 
the title Eurasian Economic Union and not just Eurasian Union was chosen as the 
official name of the project or that one of the key professional principles of the 
‘supranational’ Eurasian Commission is the ‘avoidance of politicization’ (EAEU 
2015b). Not only does this contradict the spill over process theorised by neo-
functionalists, where successive crises and increasing politicisation lead to greater 
integration, but in many ways the idea that it is possible to achieve meaningful 




The appearance of the EAEU in 2015 is a great deal more modest when viewed 
diachronically over the entire post-Soviet period. The institution of the Eurasian 
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Commission, for example, did not appear in 2012 as a hard-earned response to a 
succession of crises which forced member states to cede more sovereignty for the 
purposes of deeper integration. Rather, the Eurasian Commission, along with the 
Customs Union were part of older plans that needed time to realise. The CIS 
Conceptions of an Economic Union treaty, for example, signed in 1993, envisaged a 
Customs Union while the formation of EurAsEC in 2001 saw proposals for a Eurasian 
Commission to promote original CIS economic integration goals (Sakwa 2015, p. 16).  
Rather than spill over, the appearance of the EAEU is more like a delayed reaction to 
the idea, accepted at an earlier date, that shared problems require collective action. 
There is no question that the on-going effects of the 2008 global financial crisis have 
pushed regional leaders to realise older integration commitments, but as discussed 
below, the global economic down-turn is just one of a number of shared, long-term 
problems facing EAEU member states.  
In essence, EAEU member states, notably the founding states of Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia, hold similar views on their own circumstances that allow us to talk in 
general terms of a shared ‘Eurasian identity’, which in a number of areas sees a 
converging outlook to region-building as well as a similar application of a self/other 
perspective (Neumann 2003, p.160). As argued in this section, although this shared 
identity offers a partial explanation for Eurasian economic integration, at a deeper level 
identity politics also explain why integration has taken so long and why reproductive, as 
opposed to transformative integration is the only real option. 
 
Eurasian identity? 
The first area where this converging outlook and self/other application is visible is in 
the acknowledgement that national economies must be modernised in order to increase 
competitiveness and to prosper in the globalised economy, but in a gradual way that 
avoids economic shock and any resultant instability. As such, the whole idea of the 
EAEU is that it is better to first work with ‘ours’ – a small group of post-Soviet states 
with shared history, a common language and a similar elite with a shared Soviet 
socialisation – than to plunge head first into the global economy. Kazakhstan in 
particular champions this ‘stepping stone’ approach where ‘Eurasian’ modernisation is 
viewed as a means to greater integration in the global economy, in line with 
Kazakhstan’s commitment to stability. 
Another area where Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia appear to share a converging 
outlook and self/other application is in a geo-economic sense. For each EAEU member 
state, China in the East and the EU in the West are seen as strategic partners in certain 
areas, but as strategic competitors in others. As such, an important component of 
Eurasian integration includes ‘defensive regionalism’ and trade diversion in order to 
protect domestic producers. Russia’s interests in this area revolve around tariffs to 
protect key manufacturing sectors, such as automobile and aircraft manufacturing 
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industries. For Kazakhstan, the inclusion of Kyrgyzstan – essentially an ‘offshore’ for 
the re-export of Chinese goods – is a step to protect its domestic market. 
Finally, a by no means unimportant aspect of a shared identity is seen in the security 
sphere. Regional economic integration has always had a security aspect, but for the 
EAEU there is a growing realisation that the region is particular prone to instability. 
NATOs phased withdraw from Afghanistan will likely pose future challenges in Central 
Asia, but the fear of ‘colour revolution’ and regime change in EAEU member states is 
palpable, in particular following events in Ukraine in 2013/2014: 
‘There is also a widely-shared view that the ‘new’ Ukraine’s pro-Western 
orientations have led the country to chaos. Here, a government’s overthrow is seen 
as a catastrophe. Hence Eurasian integration is perceived as a remedy against the 
threat of a Crimean scenario’ (Interview, Belarus, 2014). 
However, identity as a driver for integration should not be overstated. At best, identity 
offers an explanation for converging interests between member state leaders at this 
present juncture and a reason why Eurasian integration received the fresh impetus when 
it did. At a deeper level, identity and Eurasian integration are much more complex and 
actually present a barrier to transformative integration, and nowhere is this more evident 
than in the divergent views of ‘Eurasianism’ in each member state.  
Putin’s advisor on Eurasian integration, Sergei Glazyev, for example, has highlighted 
the pre-existing ideological foundations of Eurasianism, including shared cultural, 
historical and even political traditions as something that sets the EAEU apart from 
similar integration projects around the world (Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015, p. 61). In 
particular, Glazyev singled out the contribution of Lev Gumilev, a Soviet intellectual 
(1912-1992), as particularly important for the present project. Gumilev, it should be 
noted, is one Eurasian philosopher who commands the respect in both Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Putin directly referred to Gumilev in his 2012 address to the Federal 
Assembly (Putin 2012) while Nazarbaev has long held an affinity with this thinker. In 
May 1996, Nazarbaev signed a presidential decree to rename the Akmolinskii 
University in Astana the ‘L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University’ in honour of the 
philosopher (Nazarbaev 1996). 
However, Gumilev did not write about economic integration. He is also one of many 
Eurasian thinkers, reflecting the fact that Eurasianism is a polysemantic, multivalent 
concept that is open to interpretation (Laruelle 2012). But, the problem with the 
Eurasian concept lies with one particular interpretation termed Russian ‘neo-
Eurasianism’ associated with Aleksandr Dugin and others, which views economic 
integration strictly in terms of restoring Russia’s ‘great power’ status. Rather than a 
liberal economic project, Eurasianism fits a Russian nationalist preoccupation of 
limiting reliance on the west, including western values, and creating a multi-polar 
world, with Eurasia, under Russia’s leadership, representing one of these poles. 
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From this perspective, Eurasianism is not only a contested concept, but a divisive one, 
closely associated with Russian nationalism. In the context of presidential ‘manual 
control’, its influence on the integration process may be negligible at present, but it 
none the less raises concerns in other EAEU member states, in particular in Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, that economic integration could potentially morph into an entirely different 
project: 
‘Eurasianism is an invention imposed by Russia, one that we don’t quite like here. 
Unless people are paid to support it’ (Interview, Belarus, 2014). 
In addition, the plans for expanding the Eurasian Union have a weak Eurasian logic at 
present and do indeed appear to be driven more by Russia’s own geopolitical interests. 
The limits of Eurasian Union expansion, according to the Eurasian Commission are 
those places where Russian is either a first of second language (Interview, Eurasian 
Commission, 2014), but this has not stopped the EAEU establishing contact with a 
coterie of out-of-region states with close ties to Russia, such as Vietnam and Egypt. 
Syria, a high-profile Russian ally in the Middle East has been repeatedly linked with the 
EAEU, despite the on-going civil war. In July 2015, during a visit to Moscow, the 
Syrian prime minister revealed that his country was holding talks on EAEU 
membership (RIA 2015). 
As mentioned below, the question of expanding the EAEU, how fast and in what 
directions draws a range of, at times, contradictory responses from member states. 
Within each member state there is a feeling that there is a choice between either 
widening or deepening the integration process and that, if forced to choose, priority 
should be given to the latter. Kazakhstan, for example, has stressed the ‘economic only’ 
aspect of integration, with many in Astana supporting a gradual approach to expansion, 
extending membership only to those countries that are competitive and which bring 
economic ‘value added’ to the EAEU. Although, there is an opinion in some member 
states that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should be incorporated into the EAEU, as 
unlike European post-Soviet republics, they do not have an alternative, there is little 
support outside of Russia for ‘exotic’ members, such as Syria. 
In the absence of agreement on the pace and direction of expansion and what constitutes 
Eurasian identity, the conclusion drawn by many is that the EAEU is already a great 
deal more politicised than many member states would like. The expansion of the EAEU 
to include Armenia in January 2015 is a case in point. Without a shared border with any 
EAEU member state and with hostile relations with neighbouring Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, Armenia’s inclusion drew reservations from both Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Belarus was concerned that Armenia’s transition period, granted to harmonise the 
latter’s existing WTO tariff commitments with the Customs Union would give 
Armenian producers competitive advantage over Belarus producers. Kazakhstan was 
concerned that Armenia’s inclusion may complicate Astana’s good relations with 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. However, there was a perception that Moscow wanted to 
19 
 
reward Armenia for choosing Eurasian over European integration and to strengthen 
Russia’s position in the region: 
‘Why is Armenia pursuing membership of the Customs Union? … Russia wishes 
to increase its influence in the South Caucuses, in particular following the signing 
of the [Association] Agreement between Georgia and the EU’ (Interview, Armenia, 
2014). 
Armenia’s position as a ‘Eurasian’ nation is also open to question. Despite the creation 
of a Ministry for international integration and reform in November 2014 in order to 
speed up EAEU membership, in the period 2009-2013 Armenia was busy preparing for 
integration with the EU. Armenia even has a parliamentary committee for EU 
integration in the present parliamentary convocation, showing the suddenness of the 
country’s foreign policy U-turn. The position among the Armenian elite and public 
concerning integration with Russia is largely pragmatic, with a realisation that Russia 
has a strong say in the country’s economic development and security. But, many 
Armenians consider their nation European not Eurasian and the choice of the EAEU, 
either as a civilizational choice or as an integration project is not considered 
‘progressive’. For some experts residing in Armenia, the rejection of the EU 
Association Agreement threatens to undo positive efforts to tackle corruption and 
modernize the economy (Roks 2014) and opinion-poll data shows a majority of 
Armenians favour deepening relations with both the EU and EAEU (Civilitas 2014). 
 
Regime identity 
In some ways, EAEU integration is different to earlier CIS integration in the sense that 
it has already achieved a great deal more. However, a certain truism still remains – the 
degree to which leaders wish to see integration work is a function of how they think it 
will impact national sovereignty (Olcott et. al. 1999, p. 22). One of the reasons why 
sovereignty is guarded so tightly by member state elites is that their political survival 
depends on their ability to remain ‘sovereigns’, and to maintain tight control over the 
state. This is the reality of authoritarian integration. But for smaller member states – 
which in the context of significant asymmetry means all EAEU members except Russia 
– integration is a fine balancing act, where either too much or too little of it poses a 
direct threat to the power of incumbents. 
In Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the choice of Eurasian integration is an 
acknowledgement that Russia is an important but also unavoidable partner. For 
Armenia and Belarus, regime survival directly depends on Russian subsides and 
security guarantees, for Kazakhstan economic prosperity and modernisation depends on 
continued access to Russian transit corridors and the huge Russian market of 145 
million people. However, in each member state there is an acknowledgment that the 
benefits of the EAEU are finely balanced. Russia is seen as an opportunity but also a 
threat by all EAEU member states.  
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The first point to note is that each member state has its own ‘regime identity’ that serves 
as the basis for legitimacy and that is an important consideration when it comes to 
integration. Kazakhstan’s regime identity is strongly bound to ethnic Kazakh 
nationalism, albeit hidden in an official discourse that emphasises the country’s multi-
national reality. According to the 2009 census, only 58.9 per cent of the population are 
ethnic Kazakhs with ethnic Russians comprising 25.9 per cent (Embassy KZ 2015), but 
this has not stopped the authorities from introducing plans to promote Kazakh language, 
what Nazarbaev has termed the ‘spiritual pivot’ of the nation (Nazrbaev 2012). These 
plans include a programme for increasing the number of Kazakh speakers in the country 
to 95 per cent by 2025 and a controversial plan to switch from a Cyrillic to a Latin 
script for the Kazakh alphabet. Any moves toward deeper integration that involve 
ceding more sovereignty must balance the ruling group’s ideational commitment to 
Kazakh nationalism and prevent opponents outflanking them with nationalist appeals. 
For Belarus, regime and state identity are both fragile and inexorably entwined. Unlike 
Kazakhstan, nationalism is not a core feature as much as the commitment to a ‘socially 
oriented state’, meaning that levels of state ownership and subsidies in the Belarus 
economy are particularly high, even relative to Kazakhstan and Russia which are also 
characterised by high levels of state intervention. Despite a commitment to 
privatisation, estimates for the Belarus economy in 2014 put the level of state ownership 
at around 80 per cent (Indexmundi 2014). The social contract between the Lukashenko 
regime and the public rules out any shock therapy and rapid economic change, and so it 
was no surprise that during the process of drafting the EAEU treaty, it was Belarus that 
was most interested in member states preserving independent economic policies and 
that the EAEU should be ‘coordinated’ or ‘harmonized’ without a common policy 
(Butrin and Netreba 2014). 
But, what both Belarus and Kazakhstan have in common is a fear that too much 
integration will pave the way for Russian capital to dominate their respective 
economies. In Belarus, the 2011 financial crisis saw the Eurasian Development Bank 
intervene with the first of several loans designed to stabilise the economy, but 
conditioned on a package of reforms, including privatisation of the heavily state-owned 
economy. However, Belarus has so far resisted calls to undertake serious economic 
reform, viewing privatisation as a way for Russian capital to buy up Belarusian 
businesses. In January 2014, for example, Lukashenko accused Russian companies of 
trying to buy key Belarusian enterprises, namely oil refineries ‘on the cheap’ 
(Khodasevich 2014a).  
But, Lukashenko’s resistance to privatisation is less a concern with preserving the 
socially oriented state model and more the fear that the regime will lose control over 
key financial flows (Frear 2012, p. 159). At the same time, there is a fear that Russia, 
once in control of key enterprises, will use this position to eventually replace 
Lukashenko with someone more congenial to Moscow. In a speech to the Belarus 
Security Council in December 2014, Lukashenko identified NATO and internal 
dissenters as a threat to national security, but also Russia (The Moscow Times 2014).  
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In Kazakhstan, there is also a persistent fear that bigger Russian companies will 
swallow up domestic competition, and this is an issue that is delaying the harmonisation 
of certain policies. In fact, Belarus president Lukashenko accused Kazakhstan of 
delaying the transformation of EurAsEC into the Eurasian Economic Union until the 
eventual date of January 2015, at a time when Belarus and Russia were pushing for the 
signing of the agreement in 2012 (News.ru 2012). The official reason for the delay was 
Astana’s desire to consider the effects of economic union on small and medium 
business (Nasha gazeta 2012), but this was also an acknowledgment that the 
Kazakhstan leadership is not altogether convinced domestic producers will succeed 
under conditions of competition with larger Russian companies. As if to remind 
Kazakhstan’s leadership of the need to retain as many areas of competitive advantage 
with Russia as possible, in 2013, the pro-business, party Ak Zhol accused ‘partners’ in 
the Customs Union of attempting to influence national legislation, in particular VAT 
levels (Peruashev 2013), which are significantly lower than those in Russia. 
When it comes to Armenia, regime identity also establishes certain limits to integration, 
although Armenia is an anomaly within the EAEU. Armenia is notable for its strong 
ethno-nationalism in what is a very ethnically homogenous state. The conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh has served as a rallying call for all political figures, but also for 
those promoting closer ties with Russia. As such, Armenia retains a pragmatic view of 
Eurasianism. This view is grounded in Armenia’s geographical reality as a ‘cross-road’ 
nation positioned between Asia, Europe and the Middle East, but also an understanding 
of the country’s near total reliance on Russia.  
But unlike other EAEU member states, the ability of ruling elites to retain power is to 
an extent related to their ability to protect certain freedoms. Armenia has a relatively 
developed civil society and a relatively pluralistic political landscape. English is more 
widely spoken and the level of democratic development greater. Armenia, for example, 
is ranked 78 out of 180 countries in terms of media freedom, compared to Russia (152), 
Belarus (157) and Kazakhstan (160) (Reporters without borders 2015). This puts 
Armenia out of step with other member states, which view Armenia’s liberal civil 
society as a threat. In March 2014, Konstantin Kosachev, the head of Russia’s 
Rossotrudnichestvo – a state organisation charged with facilitating CIS cooperation – 
gave an interview in which he suggested that Armenia had too many NGOs ‘agitating’ 
for the country’s EU integration (Khimshiashvili 2014) and in May 2014, the Russian 
ambassador to Armenia suggested that the government ‘neutralise’ those NGOs 
preventing closer relations between the two countries (Volynkin 2014). For Armenia, 
closer EAEU integration may come at the price of polarising political reforms and the 
adoption of restrictive legislation seen in the other member states. 
The existence of so-called ‘Eurasia-scepticism’ in member states at all levels of society, 
including the business community and the ruling elite (Vinokurov 2014) almost from 
the outset of integration, reveals the difficult balancing act that EAEU leaders must 
strike as they seek to benefit from integration without losing key constituencies. At this 
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stage, at least, there is an expectation that integration will bring net benefits to all 




EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON EURASIAN INTEGRATION 
Regional integration does not occur in a vacuum (Nye 1968, p. 414), but is very much 
shaped by the international environment surrounding it. In many cases, exogenous 
factors serve as the immediate driver for integration and this is certainly true for the 
EAEU. As mentioned in the previous section, for the EAEU, a combination of 
international and regional economic and security concerns are pushing the integration 
process forward. However, regardless of the drivers for Eurasian economic integration, 
the central argument presented in this article is that the EAEU, at this stage, is about 
reproducing not transforming sovereignty. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the 
EAEU is not a transformative project comparable to the EU, and even if there was a 
genuine desire among member state leaders to take the EAEU down this path in the 
future, significant barriers remain. As mentioned in the previous section, identity issues 
and the fierce protection of sovereignty limit the ability of member states to realise even 
the modest goals of trade liberalisation. 
Moreover, the external influences on Eurasian integration, when considered in the 
context of the Ukraine crisis, 2013-2015, serve to exacerbate long-standing coordination 
problems, as well as raising the costs of integration for each member state involved. 
Taken together, these coordination issues and rising costs reveal further barriers the 
EAEU must overcome, but also the way in which member states view their own 
commitment to the integration process, providing more support for the idea of 
reproductive as opposed to transformative integration. 
 
Coordination problems 
The crisis in Ukraine, sparked by the refusal of former president Viktor Yanukovych to 
sign an Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 and to follow a path of 
closer European integration, remains an important external influence on Eurasian 
economic integration. Ukraine was an important trading partner with each of the EAEU 
founding states and so it was no surprise that Ukraine’s inclusion in the project was a 
major objective from the outset. Even after the coup that removed Yanukovych from 
office in February 2014, EAEU member states had not given up hope that Ukraine 
would change course in the future. At the signing of the EAEU founding agreement in 
Astana in May 2014, Belarus President Lukashenko commented that ‘sooner or later the 
Ukrainian leadership will understand where its happiness lies’ (NTV 2014). 
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But the real issue for Eurasian integration is not so much the loss of Ukraine for the 
project (although this was significant), but in the manifestation of hard competition 
between Russia and the EU and, by extension, the US. The removal of Yanukovych and 
the chain of events which followed, including Russia’s annexation of Crimea, conflict 
in the east of Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as Russia’s 
own counter sanctions, have served to create extra pressure of the integration process. It 
was of little surprise that Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev – who originally suggested 
the idea of a Eurasian Union in 1994 – made a trip to Ukraine in December 2014 to 
meet Yanokovych’s presidential successor, Petr Poroshenko, in an attempt to regulate 
the conflict. As an important leader of the EAEU with a great deal of his own political 
capital personally invested in its success, he also acknowledged on the eve of the trip 
the ability of on-going economic sanctions directed against Russia to significantly 
reduce the potential of the EAEU (ZN, UA 2014).  
However, rather than reveal the coordination of EAEU policies toward non-participants, 
this apparent show of solidarity and willingness of a senior statesman, such as 
Nazarbaev, to fly to Kiev shows how the current international impasse is serving to 
exacerbate existing tensions and coordination problems. Ultimately, Nazarbaev’s 
meeting with the new Ukrainian leadership in December 2014 was as much about 
securing lucrative bi-lateral trade contracts as it was about regulating the conflict, and 
Poroshenko’s statements following the meeting left no doubt that Nazarbaev, contrary 
to the Russian position, fully supported the principle of territorial integrity and 
Ukrainian sovereignty (Forbes 2015). Kazakhstan, it should be noted, chose to abstain 
on the UN resolution in March 2014 calling on states not to recognise changes to the 
status of the Crimea region (UN 2014). Armenia, Belarus and Russia voted against the 
resolution.  
In fact, the on-going Ukraine crisis, as well as the general volatility of the global 
economy has already revealed tensions between EAEU member states as well as an 
inability or unwillingness to coordinate policy. In February 2014, for example, 
Kazakhstan announced a shock 19 per cent devaluation of its national currency, the 
tenge, in response to a weakening Russian rouble (Lillis 2014a). This move sparked 
fears of a currency war and a disruptive ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ cycle of devaluation, as 
each EAEU member state tries to gain competitive advantage for domestic producers 
(Rao 2014). Almost to confirm this ongoing process, in January 2015, the Belarus 
Central Bank made a seven per currency devaluation – the second major devaluation in 
a week – in response to the weakening Russian rouble (Reuters 2015a). 
Tensions and coordination problems have also been particularly evident in Russia’s 
attempt to enforce its own counter sanctions, drawn up in response to EU and US 
sanctions following the annexation of Crimea. In August 2014, Russia imposed an 
embargo on imports of meat, fish and dairy products, as well as fruit and vegetables 
from the USA, Canada, Norway, Australia, the EU, but also Moldova which, like 
Ukraine, declined overtures from the EAEU and opted to sign an EU Association 
Agreement. Despite this embargo, products from these countries have continued to find 
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their way to the Russian market, with the authorities pointing the finger squarely at 
Belarus and Kazakhstan (Bondarenko 2014).  
Perhaps the most illustrative example is the case of Belarusian exports following the 
embargo. Following Russia’s ban on the import of Moldovan apples, Belarusian imports 
of the same product rose 24 fold (Regnum 2014). Aleksandr Lukashenko, answering 
allegations of taking advantage of open borders to undermine the Russian ban 
exclaimed ‘they shut Moldova, for what? To make an example of them? …it doesn’t 
bring us any dividends’ (Nezavisimaya gazeta 2014). In November 2014, a number of 
Belarusian food producers were refused access to the Russian market because the 
Russian food inspection agency found their products to contain harmful substances, 
including the metal chrome (Rossel’khoznadzor 2014). While there has been some 
suggestion that the Russian authorities where acting to limit Belarus’s access to the 
market for the benefit of domestic producers, a more plausible explanation is that 
Russian retaliatory sanctions against the EU has led to a surge in demand for foodstuffs, 
with producers in Belarus and elsewhere struggling to meet quality standards in a rush 
to profit (Khodasevich 2014b).  
Although there is no question that the Ukraine conflict has heightened tensions between 
EAEU member states, this is by no means new, but reflects a longer-standing pattern of 
coordination problems. Even before the Ukraine crisis, there was evidence that Russia’s 
‘close partner’s – Belarus and Kazakhstan – were not willing to jeopardise their own 
interests to support Russian initiatives. In 2010, Russia banned the import of American 
chicken on grounds that it failed to meet new sanitary standards established following 
the creation of the Customs Union, although Kazakhstan was subsequently accused of 
circumventing this ban by re-exporting chicken to Russia from US suppliers (RIA 
2010). At the end of 2011, Russian authorities banned cheese imports from Ukraine for 
allegedly failing to meet quality standards in what was seen as a move to apply pressure 
on Kiev during a gas-pricing dispute (Bryzgalova 2012). For its part, Belarus, despite 
being heavily dependent on Russian subsides and despite officials suggesting they 
would follow Russia’s suit, refused to impose a similar ban (Pravda 2012).  
This particular coordination problem between Moscow and Minsk can be added to a 
long list of bi-lateral disputes in recent years over gas supply, milk and meat (so-called 
milk and meat wars), dumping allegations (sugar), and the claim that Belarus was 
exporting petroleum products under the guise of solvents and lubricants to avoid paying 
Russia the export duty. In September 2014, the Russian government submitted plans to 
increase taxes on the extraction of mineral deposits, including oil. This tax manoeuvre, 
approved by Vladimir Putin in November 2014, could cost Belarus up to one billion 
USD, and drew a particular vitriolic response from the Belarus president: 
‘Is this normal? This is an abnormal relationship ... this behaviour is often called 
imperial ambitions in surrounding countries, in the former republics of the [Soviet] 
Union’ (Belta 2014). 
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From 6 August 2015, following Vladimir Putin’s presidential decree, authorities began 
destroying embargoed goods found on the territory of the Russian Federation (Fokht 
2015), further raising the stakes for re-exporters in Belarus and Kazakhstan and further 
complicating the commitment to the free movement of goods. Overall, the inability of 
EAEU member states to coordinate their policies in the face of challenging external 
circumstances is undermining trust. Mistrust, as noted by some scholars, is key feature 
of regional integration (Schmitter 2004, p. 50), but for some within the EAEU, the 
restoration of mutual trust and confidence and the removal of fears that some member 
states will push their respective interests at the expense of partners was noted as a 
modest but important goal of Eurasian economic integration from the outset (Interview, 
Kazakhstan, 2014). 
 
The costs of integration 
Coordination problems between member states have been one by-product of the 
unfavourable international context surrounding the EAEU. However, a bigger problem 
is that of rising costs. If the costs of disintegration are seen by some as too prohibitive to 
be an option (Libman and Vonokurov 2012), then the costs of further integration may 
push all EAEU member states to rethink their commitment. 
The costs of integration are best seen in terms of Russia’s position at the heart of the 
EAEU. In view of the stark asymmetry between EAEU member states, Russia is the 
economic engine upon which the success of the project depends, but in the context of 
economic sanctions, instability in Ukraine and a general economic slowdown in Russia, 
this now looks problematic. The Russian economy is presently experiencing significant 
difficulties. Official statistics show that the Russian economy shrank by 4.6 per cent in 
the second quarter of 2015, and IMF projections suggest that sanctions linked to the 
Ukraine crisis may cause as much as a 9 per cent contraction in Russian GDP over the 
next few years (Reuters 2015b). In terms of effects, Russia’s continuing economic and 
international problems will likely complicate both deepening and widening the EAEU. 
The first point to note is a general one that the strength of the Russian economy will 
have a large bearing on its future expansion. Comparative studies of regionalism have 
long noted the dilemma faced by states in the immediate proximity which find 
themselves on the outside of a regional integration project (Mattli 1999). In essence, the 
more welfare benefits integration bestows on member states, the greater the prospects 
other states in the region will decide they have little choice but to join. Uzbekistan, for 
example, an important sub-regional power with a market size of just under 30 million 
people, is watching developments with the EAEU closely, and was mentioned by the 
Eurasian Commission as a potential candidate for membership. For this reason, it was 
interesting that a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, 
in July 2015 saw no mention of the EAEU. Instead, the discussion centred on another 
regional integration project – the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and it 
possible expansion to include India (Kremlin 2015). 
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But, a bigger problem for Moscow is how to keep all EAEU members on the integration 
course in the context of reduced financial leverage without propping up struggling 
economies and paying more for the integration process. Russia, it should be noted, is 
now directly subsidising Crimea following its annexation in March 2014, and with 
sanctions in place, the opportunities for attracting foreign investment are negligible. 
Kyrgyzstan, for example, secured substantial funding from Russia ahead of its eventual 
EAEU membership and will likely require more, if it is to successfully restructure its 
economy to reduce reliance on re-exporting Chinese goods.  
Much of the attraction of the EAEU for member states is tied to Russian subsides. Many 
states in the region are indirectly reliant on the Russian market but also the Russian 
labour market, in the form of remittances, which have suffered due to the weakening 
rouble. In addition, there are also more direct means through which Russia bolsters the 
economies of neighbouring states. Armenia, for example, was granted a gas discount in 
2013 after Yerevan agreed to join the EAEU, and a further 13 percent reduction again in 
April 2015, after Armenia actually joined (Azatutyan 2015a). Belarus, a major CIS 
consumer of Russian oil, which it receives at low prices, refines and sells it on to 
European markets with high profit margins for Belarusian and Russian companies. 
Belarus also adds an export duty, generating an additional windfall for the state. In 
October 2014, Belarus signed an agreement with Russia meaning that all export duties 
generated on the 23 million tonnes of oil earmarked for Belarus in 2015 would be 
entered into the Belarus state budget (Interfax 2014). Informed estimates of Russian 
subsides to Belarus are placed at around 15 per cent of Belarusian GDP (Interview, 
Russia, 2014). 
In an interview in January 2015, Russian finance minister, Sergei Shatalov, commented 
that the creation of the EAEU and the removal of tariffs was costing Russia around 30 
billion USD a year in subsidies to partners (Reuters 2014), and there is no doubt that 
Russian money is key for EAEU success: 
‘The driver of economic integration in the EAEU is subsidies from Russia to other 
member states. Further enlargement requires more resources to be distributed by 
Russia to new and existing members’ (Interview, Russia, 2014). 
In addition to the financial costs of integration, there are also political risks for Moscow. 
As the international and economic climate deteriorate there is a danger that opposition 
groups within member states will attribute economic problems to EAEU membership, 
and try to mobilise popular dissatisfaction, nationalism and anti-Russian sentiment 
against incumbents. To an extent this is already happening. Kyrgyzstan, which has a 
strong pro-US and pro-Saudi lobby and a recent history of colour revolutions, has seen 
nationalists attempting to mobilise on an anti-integration platform in 2014 with experts 
predicting the next phase of destabilisation for the country due to a confluence of 
political and economic factors, including the effects of EAEU integration (Panfilova 
2015). In December 2014, the Kyrgyz Labour Ministry commented that unemployment 
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could double on joining the EAEU, as bazaars re-exporting Chinese goods are forced to 
close (Rehm 2015). 
The situation is similar in Armenia. Armenia’s economy contracted in the first half of 
2015 following accession to the EAEU – the country’s first decline in domestic and 
foreign trade volumes since the 2009 recession (Azatutyan 2015b). There is a danger 
that anti-government forces will mobilise popular dissatisfaction to frame Eurasian 
integration as at best a ‘status quo’ choice and push for EU integration as the only 
‘progressive choice’ able to tackle the county’s economic and social problems. To an 
extent this has already happened with the large-scale protests the capital Yerevan in the 
summer of 2015 against price rises in utilities (notably electricity tariffs) that followed 
Armenia’s accession to the EAEU (Avedissian 2015). 
Armenian society, despite its ethnic homogeneity, is divided along pro and anti-
government lines and the fact that the man responsible for taking Armenia into the 
EAEU, incumbent president Serzh Sarkisian, is constitutionally obliged to step down 
after his second term of office (2013-2018) means that there is a risk for Russia that 
Armenia will try to revise relations with the EU at some point in the future and balance 
its foreign policy vectors. Although a complete revision of Armenia’s Eurasian choice is 
unlikely due to Yerevan’s significant security and economic dependence on Moscow, as 
mentioned in the previous section, Armenian identity pushes it toward the European 
vector and countervailing views of Armenian-Russian relations do exist: 
‘There is a hope in some quarters that Armenia won’t sign the EAEU agreement. 
There is also some support for EU membership and NATO membership and the 
withdrawal of Russia’s military bases’ (Interview, Armenia 2014). 
Overall, the international context surrounding the EAEU has raised the costs for each 
EAEU member state. For Russia’s partners, there is no desire to sign up to an 
isolationist project. One of the key measures of EAEU success identified in each 
member state is an improvement in the investment climate. However, available FDI 
figures for EAEU member states, notably Belarus and Russia show a sharp drop in the 
period 2010-2014 (World Bank 2015). There is also no desire among Russia’s partners 
to give up their multi-vectored foreign policies. For Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
the value of the EAEU is significantly reduced if it undermines relations with third 
countries. 
There is also the fear of Russian unpredictability that is no doubt making some member 
states feel uncomfortable, not least Putin’s ‘Crimea Doctrine’ (Putin 2014b) and 
Russia’s willingness to defend the interests of ethnic Russians living beyond the 
territory of the Russian Federation. In Kazakhstan, the combination of a large ethnic 
Russian population in the north of the country and uncertainty concerning the post-
Nazarbaev power succession opens up the possibility of Russian intervention in the 
future. Reminiscent of Russia’s lease of the Sevastopol naval base from Ukraine – a 
major factor in the annexation of Crimea – Moscow and Astana have unresolved issues 
surrounding the lease of the Baikonur space launch facility located in the south of 
28 
 
Kazakhstan. Unable to reach an agreement, the two sides signed a three-year ‘road map’ 
agreement in December 2013, but not before Kazakhstani officials had threatened to 
eject Moscow from the complex (Lillis 2014b). During an awkward exchange in August 
2014, Vladimir Putin appeared to question the legitimacy of Kazakhstani statehood 
resulting in Kazakhstani president, Nursulan Nazarbaev, again stating that Kazakhstan 
would leave the union, if there was a threat to the nation’s sovereignty (RT 2014). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article is aimed as a corrective to existing literature, both narrow realist accounts 
that frame Eurasian integration in terms of the expediencies of Russia’s foreign policy 
objectives, dismissing the internal dynamics of integration and the positions of the other 
member states, and those studies that view ever more integration as inevitable. It does 
not challenge the real achievements of EAEU, as documented in other studies 
(Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012a; Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015), but rather points to the 
barriers and modest aims of the project as one intended to reproduce rather than 
transform sovereignty.  
Comparative experience tells us that regional integration projects evolve over time and 
that the original arrangements at the moment of inception are subject to revision as the 
endogenous and exogenous circumstances of the regional organisation change. 
Mercosur and Latin American integration existed on and off for the best part of 100 
years before the changes to the international system and internal progress with 
democracy paved the way for deepening integration in the 1990s. ASEAN’s famous 
‘informal’ approach to integration and loose institutional structure was revised in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis leading to, among other things, tighter control 
over the economic aspects of integration. The experience of Mercosur and ASEAN as 
relatively successful integration projects also point to the possibility of equifinality – 
different ways to reach the same end point. In this case, EU-style integration is not the 
only game in town. 
However, one of the biggest premises of Eurasian integration is that member states are 
ready to commit to nascent supranational institutions, that ‘participating countries’ are 
now ‘willing to delegate some of their recently acquired sovereignty’ (Glazyev and 
Tkachuk 2015, p. 61). What this article has shown is that this is not the case. At this 
juncture, member states are attempting to use economic integration to strengthen 
sovereignty and this is reflected in the institutional arrangements of the EAEU, but also 
the tensions and coordination problems that exist between them. There is no genuine 
willingness on the part of member states to transform relations with partners by ceding 
sovereignty to supranational institutions, at least not at this stage. As member states are 
making stringent efforts to avoid politicising the integration process, there is little way 
future crises can generate spill over. In many ways, this situation is exacerbated by the 
way member states view independent actors within their own polities. The prospects of 
the business community linking up with the Eurasian Commission to drive the 
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integration process are unlikely to be tolerated by entrenched regimes whose main goal 
is to stay in power. 
Moreover, this article has shown why this is the case. At present, identity politics is an 
important intervening variable, but one which inhibits rather than facilitates integration. 
The same is true of international factors surrounding Eurasian integration. Without 
doubt exogenous influences feature prominently in the development of the EAEU. As 
Vladimir Putin noted in a keynote speech in 2007: ‘history has convincingly shown on 
enough occasions that the situation in Russia in many ways determines the situation in 
the surrounding countries in the Eurasian region’ (Putin 2007). The success of the 
project will depend on how quickly the Russian economy can get back on track and if 
the unfavourable external economic and political circumstances improve, not least 
because Russia’s EAEU partners and prospective members are watching this closely. 
But, with western rhetoric hardening toward Russia (Giles et. al. 2015) and with little 
sign that sanctions will be eased or lifted in the near future, the prospect that member 
states may revise their integration commitments remains. As one interviewee noted: 
‘when they see some benefits in uniting, they unite, but if tomorrow the mutual benefits 
disappear, the union will fall apart’ (Interview, Russia 2014). While disintegration and 
‘spill-back’ may entail too high costs for all involved, if Russia’s present economic and 
international problems continue then there is a real possibility that EAEU partners will 
use Moscow’s weakness to seek more opt-outs and concessions to remain in the Union. 
This more probable latter option will serve to slow down integration and increase the 
chances that Eurasian economic integration, just like previous attempts in the post-
Soviet period, will fail to meet the expectations of those involved. 
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